written by Hiranmay Karlekar
In their article, “This is War” in The Pioneer of April 7, 2010, Ajai Sahni and Ajit Kumar Singh have rightly regretted the absence of a societal consensus and a coherent strategy in dealing with Maoists.
The subject of societal consensus takes one to a point which Mr KPS Gill has been making for a long time: One cannot weed out extremism without good governance. Anyone with a conscience and familiar with conditions in the States and areas where the Maoist presence is significant, would know that governance in these has not only been inefficient but malign, scandalously corrupt, repressive and expropriatory in respect of tribals and the poor. Ever since independence, these areas, spread over parts of West Bengal and huge tracts of Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, have seen little development.
Besides, the fruits of whatever development that has occurred have been reaped by non-tribal outsiders. The tribals have often lacked the entrepreneurial training and background to succeed in business and industry. They have also lacked the skills necessary for the jobs which have been created and which, therefore, have gone to outsiders. Very little attention has been paid to evolving a pattern of development attuned to meeting the specific needs of tribals and preparing them to cope with the challenges of a predatory, industrial society increasingly casting its dark shadow on their world.
The genesis of the movements leading to the formation of the States of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand lay in this. Unfortunately, things have not changed much even after the formation of the new States and the acceleration of the development process that followed. Incompetent and corrupt political leadership, corrupt and exploitative bureaucracies and police forces, sharks desperate to plunder the resources of the new States, and the various local elites determined to make the most out of the opportunities created by development, have left the hindmost to the devil.
Evicted from their lands and homes to make space for new industries or mines, granted little or no compensation at all thanks to babus diverting the money meant for tribals to their own pockets, deprived of their traditional means of livelihood thanks to widespread deforestation, reduced to destitution and homelessness, many tribals become eager recruits of the Maoists.
Many thought that the Naxalite movement, whose alumni the Maoists are, was finished following the death of Charu Majumdar in police custody and the encounter deaths and arrests of a number of its senior leaders in West Bengal in the early-1970s. One also thought that the tough measures taken by the Vengal Rao Government in the middle and late-1970s had wiped out the movement in Andhra Pradesh. If the Maoists have not only confounded such perceptions but attained their present salience in India’s life, it is because of exploitation and worse. It is this prolonged record of exploitation and oppression that makes many, otherwise totally opposed to the Maoists and their political goals, hesitate to endorse strong counter-insurrectionary measures. They are particularly hesitant because they feel that these would enable the police, whose conduct toward tribals has been predatory and worse, to run completely wild.
Good governance in the form removing corruption, predatory behaviour by babus and policemen, and ensuring that development does not spell destitution for vast numbers, needs to be an important part of any strategy to defeat Maoists. Once done, it will not only deprive Maoists of ready recruits but also go a long way in producing the societal consensus that has to be a central factor in any successful counter-insurgency operation.
The argument that good governance is impossible as long as Maoists do not allow development work in their areas, makes sense. It can, however, begin in areas where they are not dominant. Success in such effort will not only make it difficult for them to expand their influence in these but, as the word spreads, convince people in even Maoist-dominated areas that it is possible to have development, justice and freedom under a parliamentary system and, along with measures that show that insurgency does not pay, help to undermine their influence in their strongholds. .
The process will be exactly the same as what Mao Tse-Tung prescribed — proceed from the peripheries to the centre. Only, it would be applied against the Maoists! But what if Maoists disrupt the effort to establish good governance through attacks that spread terror? The answer lies in preventing this through the evolution of a coherent strategy. This will require serious thought and a multi-pronged, multi-layered approach. First, one must recognise that one is not dealing with common thugs but highly intelligent, educated and motivated leaders with excellent grasp of the doctrine, strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare. One needs officers with sound knowledge of Maoist theory and practice, who can match them.
Second, training is crucial. Jungle warfare is not the same as controlling urban riots. The Army has a Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte, Mizoram, which is among the very best in the world. Paramilitary formations trained in it should alone be sent into the jungles. Simultaneously, State police forces need to develop units specialising in coping with urban guerrilla/terrorist operations. Maoists will strike back in the cities when they are hard-pressed in their strongholds.
Third, improving police forces and the civil administrations is imperative for combating all forms of terrorism. Police and administrative corruption has often helped Islamist terrorists to slip into this country and get false identification papers like driving licences and even passports.
Finally, one needs a comprehensive strategic and tactical approach, based on precise intelligence and integrating operations by small special forces units as well as larger formations. The Americans would have won the war in Vietnam thrice over if air-power was a decisive factor in counter-insurgency. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will also not be of great use in areas where dense forests hide movements on the ground. Helicopter-borne operations can be useful only if there is precise information, trained troops and adequate post-operation evacuation arrangements. A coherent strategy that takes cognisance of all such aspects and a number of other issues will require informed hard work to conceptualise and substantial resources to implement, both of which have been conspicuous by their absence. It is high time that things changed.
In their article, “This is War” in The Pioneer of April 7, 2010, Ajai Sahni and Ajit Kumar Singh have rightly regretted the absence of a societal consensus and a coherent strategy in dealing with Maoists.
The subject of societal consensus takes one to a point which Mr KPS Gill has been making for a long time: One cannot weed out extremism without good governance. Anyone with a conscience and familiar with conditions in the States and areas where the Maoist presence is significant, would know that governance in these has not only been inefficient but malign, scandalously corrupt, repressive and expropriatory in respect of tribals and the poor. Ever since independence, these areas, spread over parts of West Bengal and huge tracts of Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, have seen little development.
Besides, the fruits of whatever development that has occurred have been reaped by non-tribal outsiders. The tribals have often lacked the entrepreneurial training and background to succeed in business and industry. They have also lacked the skills necessary for the jobs which have been created and which, therefore, have gone to outsiders. Very little attention has been paid to evolving a pattern of development attuned to meeting the specific needs of tribals and preparing them to cope with the challenges of a predatory, industrial society increasingly casting its dark shadow on their world.
The genesis of the movements leading to the formation of the States of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand lay in this. Unfortunately, things have not changed much even after the formation of the new States and the acceleration of the development process that followed. Incompetent and corrupt political leadership, corrupt and exploitative bureaucracies and police forces, sharks desperate to plunder the resources of the new States, and the various local elites determined to make the most out of the opportunities created by development, have left the hindmost to the devil.
Evicted from their lands and homes to make space for new industries or mines, granted little or no compensation at all thanks to babus diverting the money meant for tribals to their own pockets, deprived of their traditional means of livelihood thanks to widespread deforestation, reduced to destitution and homelessness, many tribals become eager recruits of the Maoists.
Many thought that the Naxalite movement, whose alumni the Maoists are, was finished following the death of Charu Majumdar in police custody and the encounter deaths and arrests of a number of its senior leaders in West Bengal in the early-1970s. One also thought that the tough measures taken by the Vengal Rao Government in the middle and late-1970s had wiped out the movement in Andhra Pradesh. If the Maoists have not only confounded such perceptions but attained their present salience in India’s life, it is because of exploitation and worse. It is this prolonged record of exploitation and oppression that makes many, otherwise totally opposed to the Maoists and their political goals, hesitate to endorse strong counter-insurrectionary measures. They are particularly hesitant because they feel that these would enable the police, whose conduct toward tribals has been predatory and worse, to run completely wild.
Good governance in the form removing corruption, predatory behaviour by babus and policemen, and ensuring that development does not spell destitution for vast numbers, needs to be an important part of any strategy to defeat Maoists. Once done, it will not only deprive Maoists of ready recruits but also go a long way in producing the societal consensus that has to be a central factor in any successful counter-insurgency operation.
The argument that good governance is impossible as long as Maoists do not allow development work in their areas, makes sense. It can, however, begin in areas where they are not dominant. Success in such effort will not only make it difficult for them to expand their influence in these but, as the word spreads, convince people in even Maoist-dominated areas that it is possible to have development, justice and freedom under a parliamentary system and, along with measures that show that insurgency does not pay, help to undermine their influence in their strongholds. .
The process will be exactly the same as what Mao Tse-Tung prescribed — proceed from the peripheries to the centre. Only, it would be applied against the Maoists! But what if Maoists disrupt the effort to establish good governance through attacks that spread terror? The answer lies in preventing this through the evolution of a coherent strategy. This will require serious thought and a multi-pronged, multi-layered approach. First, one must recognise that one is not dealing with common thugs but highly intelligent, educated and motivated leaders with excellent grasp of the doctrine, strategy and tactics of guerrilla warfare. One needs officers with sound knowledge of Maoist theory and practice, who can match them.
Second, training is crucial. Jungle warfare is not the same as controlling urban riots. The Army has a Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Vairengte, Mizoram, which is among the very best in the world. Paramilitary formations trained in it should alone be sent into the jungles. Simultaneously, State police forces need to develop units specialising in coping with urban guerrilla/terrorist operations. Maoists will strike back in the cities when they are hard-pressed in their strongholds.
Third, improving police forces and the civil administrations is imperative for combating all forms of terrorism. Police and administrative corruption has often helped Islamist terrorists to slip into this country and get false identification papers like driving licences and even passports.
Finally, one needs a comprehensive strategic and tactical approach, based on precise intelligence and integrating operations by small special forces units as well as larger formations. The Americans would have won the war in Vietnam thrice over if air-power was a decisive factor in counter-insurgency. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles will also not be of great use in areas where dense forests hide movements on the ground. Helicopter-borne operations can be useful only if there is precise information, trained troops and adequate post-operation evacuation arrangements. A coherent strategy that takes cognisance of all such aspects and a number of other issues will require informed hard work to conceptualise and substantial resources to implement, both of which have been conspicuous by their absence. It is high time that things changed.
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